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OIL AND GAS
by
Richard W Hemingway*

A

S in previous Survey issues, this Article includes only those cases and
other developments from Texas during the preceding year that are significant. Recent developments in the following areas are examined: the
mineral estate, including cases dealing with the relationship of the mineral
estate to the surface estate; oil and gas leases; regulation cases; miscellaneous cases; and legislation.
I.

THE MINERAL ESTATE

Lomax v. Henderson' presented a question involving condemnation of
the mineral estate where, under simplified facts, the surface and one-half
of the minerals in a 200-acre tract of land were owned by A, and the remaining one-half mineral interest was owned by B. B owned no adjacent
tracts of land. The condemnor was awarded
[flee simple title in and to the [200 acres], except that defendants shall
retain all oil, gas, and other minerals in, on, or under said land, it
being provided, however, that no operations for the recovery of any
other minerals shall be conducted on the surface of
such oil, gas, and
2
said premises.
The condemnation judgment awarded $120,000 to A and B without apportionment, "with division of said sum to be in accordance with the order of
the Court to be entered at a later date.' ' 3 A filed a motion asserting a right
to all of the award as the owner of the surface of the land. B intervened,
alleging damages caused by the condemnation. The court awarded all of
the money to A on the dual ground that (1) none of the oil, gas, or mineral
interest was condemned under the award, and (2) the minerals that might
be produced from the condemned property had no reasonable cash market
value. B appealed as to both grounds.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment on the ground that the trial
court's finding that B's mineral estate had no reasonable cash market value
was not contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.
The appellate court stated that although none of the mineral estate was
actually condemned, B would be entitled to compensation for the loss of
* B.A., University of Colorado; J.D., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., University of Michigan. Paul W. Horn Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law.
1. 559 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. Id. at 466 (condemnor was the Brazos River Authority).
3. Id at 467.
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the use of the surface estate for development of the mineral estate. The
court held that the measure of this loss was the diminution of the value of
the mineral estate caused by the taking of the surface. Since expert testimony established that any market value placed on the mineral estate
would be both nominal and speculative, B was not entitled to an award.
The dissent, on the other hand, believed that previous decisions upholding
a right to compensation for interference with the use and enjoyment of
land required that B be compensated for his loss.
Imprecise draftsmanship of a deed containing a reservation of a mineral
interest led to litigation over the ownership of bonus in Houston v. Moore
Investment Co.4 The deed from Moore to Houston contained the following reservations:
There is reserved and excepted from this conveyance, and Grantor
hereby retains the title to, an undivided one-half interest in all oil, gas
or other minerals in, on or under the lands hereinabove described, but
the Grantee herein shall have the right and privilege of executing an
oil, gas and mineral lease on such land, without the joinder of Grantor, with the understanding that any such lease shall provide for a
royalty to the owners of the land in an amount not less than oneeighth of the minerals to be produced from said land, and further
provided that Grantor shall be entitled to one-half of any such royalties retained in such lease.'
Houston argued that because the deed expressly mentioned Moore's right
to one-half of the royalties retained in any lease, by implication the right to
bonus had been excluded.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that Moore was
entitled to one-half of the bonus. Because the grantor surrendered only
one incident of ownership, the right to execute an oil, gas, and mineral
lease, no other rights incident to the reserved mineral interest were affected. The court held that the recital was not a sufficiently clear expression of the parties' intention to warrant modifying the reserved mineral
interest.6 Moore, therefore, was entitled to one-half of bonuses, royalties,
and rentals. The court further held that the failure of the recital to mention bonuses or rentals did not make the deed ambiguous.
In Haddad v. Boon 7 the court applied the rule of Duhig . Peavy-Moore
Lumber Co.8 to a case involving a reserved royalty in a deed. Walker
conveyed a tract of land to the Veterans' Land Board of Texas, reserving
an undivided 1/ 16 royalty interest. The Veterans' Land Board in turn had
conveyed to Boon, excepting Walker's 1/16 royalty interest. Defendant
4. 559 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, no writ).
5. Id at 851-52.
6. The court distinguished Benge v. Scherbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953),
in which the parties had modified the reserved mineral interest by clearly expressing their
intention to do so.
7. 557 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
8.

135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940). See also R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL

AND GAS § 3.2 (1971); Hemingway, After-Acquired Title in Texas (pt. 2), 20 Sw. L.J. 310, 321
(1966).
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Boon subsequently conveyed the tract to defendant Jones, reserving a 1/32
royalty interest, without mention or exception of the 1/16 royalty reserved
to Walker. Jones executed a conveyance of the land to plaintiff Haddad
without reservation or exception of either the 1/16 or 1/32 royalty interests. All parties agreed that they were bound by Walker's 1/16 royalty
reservation. The question presented was whether Boon retained ownership of the 1/32 royalty interest. The trial court granted defendant Boon's
motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals found the doctrine of the Duhig case applicable:
when there is an overconveyance in a deed with a reserved interest, so
much of the reserved interest will be taken from the grantor as is necessary
to make the grantee whole. On this ground Haddad should have prevailed
as the owner of all royalty except the 1/ 16 reserved to Walker. Hence, the
summary judgment in Boon's favor was erroneous. Nevertheless, the court
of appeals did not render but remanded on the ground that the trial court
had not ruled on Boon's attempt to reform the deed to show the exception
of Walker's 1/16 royalty interest in addition to Boon's reserved 1/32 royalty interest. Reformation would have rendered the Duhig rule inapplicable.
Haddad is of interest because it is one of the few cases that have attempted to apply the Duhig rule to reservations of a royalty interest. In
Continental Oil Co. v. Doornbos9 the appellate court in effect applied the
Duhig rule to a case involving reformation. This decision was reversed by
the supreme court on the ground that the alternative relief of construction
of the deed had not been requested; therefore, the application of the Duhig
rules was improper, being a switch from the "equitable principles of reformation to legal rules of construction half way through the solution of the
controversy."'o
McClung v. Lawrence" was another case that applied the Duhig rule to
a reserved royalty interest. The supreme court indicated that although the
application of the Duhig rule to reserved royalty interests is proper, whenever reformation is sought as an alternative ground the case should be remanded to determine if reformation is justified. Lawrence was cited as
authority in Haddad.
Amoco Production Co. v. Braslau'2 addressed the question whether a
term royalty interest that was beyond the term terminated due to stoppage
in production under the oil and gas lease caused by the collapse of a casing. Production ceased for some three months. When the lessee could not
again obtain production, he completed in another reservoir. The trial
court held that because the cessation was temporary the term interest did
not terminate. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that stoppage
of production in the original reservoir with completion in a new reservoir
9.
1966).
10.
11.
12.

386 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1964), rev'd, 402 S.W.2d 879 (Tex.
402 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tex. 1966).
430 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. 1968).
561 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. 1978).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

was not temporary cessation.' 3
The supreme court reversed and affirmed the holding of the trial court.
The court pointed out that in drilling the well four sands were encountered, A, B, C, and D. The original completion was made in sands B and
D. After the casing collapsed, lessee completed in sand C. The court
stressed that the case did not concern cessation of production during a
period of further or deeper exploration, as all sands were encountered during the original drilling. In holding that the cessation was temporary, during which time the term royalty interest did not terminate, the court cited
the cases of Midwest Oil Corp. v. Winsauer 14 and Stuart v. Pundt,"5 but
distinguished them because neither case concerned production in new
strata.
II.

OIL AND GAS LEASES

Habendum Clause Cases. In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. 0/America V. Zimmer 6 the federal district court in Amarillo considered another case involving an oil and gas lease with a fixed term. The habendum clause
provided that the lease would remain in effect for a twelve-year primary
term and as long thereafter as oil or gas was produced from the land, with
the proviso that "this lease shall not remain in force longer than fifty (50)
years from this date."' 7 The lease was dated January 16, 1926.
On April 5, 1935, the parties entered into a supplemental agreement extending for one year the time in which a well might be commenced,' 8 and
further agreed that one well would constitute adequate development of
natural gas production over the entire 1,280 acres. The agreement continued that "said oil and gas lease shall remain in full force and effect as to all
the land included within said 1,280 acres, so long as oil or gas isproduced
from any portion thereof."' 9
The question involved was whether the last quoted language in the
agreement was sufficient to modify the original lease so as to remove the
fifty-year limitation. The court considered the lease and supplemental
agreement as a whole and held that the language did not extend the lease
beyond the original fifty-year term. Citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Southland
Royalty Co. ,2o which involved the same lease form, the court stated that
"the habendum clause traditionally controls unless properly modified by
other provisions, and the fixed term therein stated is not to be extended by
words found elsewhere in the lease not certainly directed to the modifica13. The court of appeals case, Braslau v. Amoco Prod. Co., 549 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1977), was discussed in Hemingway, Oil and Gas, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 163, 170 (1978).

14. 159 Tex. 560, 323 S.W.2d 944 (1959).
15. 338 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, writ ref'd).
16. 447 F. Supp. 66
(N.D.
n.I. Tex. 1977), airdper curiam, 576 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1978).
at 67
17. 447 F. Supp.
18. The original lease required that a well be commenced within 10 years from the date
of the lease.

19. 447 F. Supp. at 68 (emphasis added).
20. 478 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972), af'd,496 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1973).
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tion of the habendum clause."'"
Although Stephenson v. Vineyard22 is a term mineral interest case, it is
included in this section because it concerns the meaning of the term "production," a term that is generally construed to have the same meaning
whether found in a mineral or royalty deed or in an oil or gas lease. In
Stephenson a mineral reservation was to take effect at the end of two years
if there was no production from the property, or at the cessation of production if there was production at the end of the two years. A well that was
drilled and potentialed on the property prior to the end of the two-year
period indicated that production would be sufficient to prevent the reserved interest from taking effect. No gas was sold, however, until at least
one month after the end of the two-year term. The appellate court held
that although gas had been discovered, actual production had not begun
and, consequently, the mineral interest had reverted. This is in accordance
with the Texas rule that discovery is not production.
Royalty Clause Cases. The case of Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Blakley2 3
considered whether gas sold to a drilling contractor for use in drilling a
well on the leased premises constituted a sale or use "off the premises" for
which royalty and shut-in royalty was payable or came within a clause
providing that "Lessee shall have free use of oil, gas, coal and water from
said land, except water from Lessor's wells, for all operations hereunder,
and the royalty in oil, gas and coal shall be computed after deducting any
so used."" In holding that the gas sold was within the free gas clause
upon which neither royalty nor shut-in royalty was payable, the court emphasized that the gas was used solely in drilling operations on land under
the lease and not in connection with other property. The court also noted
that the royalty clause did not provide for royalty payment for gas sold for
such on-premises use.
Butler v. Exxon Corp.25 and Exxon Corp. v. Middleton26 also involved
construction of the phrase "off the premises." In Butler the court had to
determine which of the two parts of the royalty clause governed royalty
payments on gas sold into interstate commerce under twenty-year contracts of sale. The first of these parts provided, "on gas, . . . produced
from said land and sold or used offthepremises. . . ,[the royalty shall be]
the market value at the well of one-eighth of the gas so sold or used." The
other clause provided, "on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall be oneeighth of the amount realized from such sale." 27
Exxon sold the gas at the tailgate of a processing plant located some 100
feet beyond the lease lines. The royalty owners argued that the gas was
21. 447 F. Supp. at 70.
22. 564 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.). See
discussion of pooling provisions involved in this case in text accompanying note 49 infra.
23. 560 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
24.

Id at 743.

25. 559 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
26. 571 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, writ filed).
27. 559 S.W.2d at 412 (emphasis added).
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thus sold "off the premises," making the market value clause applicable.
They cited the Vela case" insupport of their position and urged the court
to adopt its reasoning, under which market value is determined by the dayto-day market value in the field, rather than by the amount received under
the long-term gas sales contracts. 29 The court distinguished Vela on the
ground that all gas sold from gas wells under the lease therein considered
was to be paid for at the "market price" at the well. In Butler, however,
the issue was whether a sale 100 feet outside the lease line was to be considered an "off the premises" market value sale or an "at the wells"
amount realized sale.
The court of appeals expressly affirmed the following finding by the trial
court:
"[Tihe term 'at the wells' means gas delivery which occurs in the vicinity of the field of production where the wells are located, rather than
at some remote location such as the other end of a gas transmission
line. For a sale to be termed 'at the wells', delivery need not occur at
the 'Christmas tree' on top of the well casing, nor is there any requirement that delivery30occur on the particularlease or unitfrom which the
gas is produced.f"
The court noted that the parties did not use mutually exclusive terms such
as "on the premises" and "off the premises," or "at the well" and "away
from the well." It accordingly held that a sale at the well was not limited
to one made on the premises and "that a sale may occur 'at the well' even
though delivery is made several hundred feet from the Christmas tree.'
As to these leases, sales were made "at the well" and royalty was properly
payable on the amount realized from the proceeds of sale under the longterm contracts.
In a separate lease involved in the controversy, the Veterans' Land
Board lease, the only royalty clause provided for royalty based on the market value of gas "produced and saved from the leased premises.",32 The
court of appeals held that the Vela case controlled and that royalty was to
be based on market value as determined at the time of the delivery to the
purchaser.3 3 Chief Justice Preslar wrote a vigorous dissent directed at the
majority opinion regarding the Veterans' Land Board lease. His dissent
was twofold: first, "market value" should be construed as the price for
which the producer sells his gas, a meaning supported by judicial construction of the term appearing in several tax statutes; second, Vela was distinguishable on the ground that the royalty clause in the Vela lease only
28. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968).
29. The price under the long-term contracts was about 19.5c per mcf, whereas the market price for the intrastate sales varies from 39.5C per mcf to $2.06 per mcf.
30. 559 S.W.2d at 414 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 416.
32. Id at 412.
33. The royalty owners had executed division orders, later revoked, that provided for
settlement based on "net proceeds at the well." Id Rejecting the trial court's reasoning that
the orders were binding contracts until revoked, the court of appeals reached the erroneous
conclusion that executing these division orders did not estop the royalty owners from claiming royalties based on market price. Id at 416-17.
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provided for royalty on gas "sold or used off the premises." The dissent
pointed out that such a clause was normally used to distinguish the free gas
used by the lessee from gas sold to the local market on a short-term or dayto-day basis. Since the Veterans' Land Board lease had no "used or sold
off the premises" clause, the dissent argued that the parties must have contemplated that the clause used in the lease applied to long-term sales of
total production rather than to short-term sales of gas. As to the former,
the reason for fixing the price of gas by each delivery does not apply, and
the price should be fixed under the long-term sales contracts.
In Middleton the court was dealing with the identical questions involved
in Butler, including the same royalty clause. Part of the gas was processed
at the lessee's processing plant, which was not located on lease lands, and
delivered to customers at the plant's tailgate. As to these deliveries, the
court concluded that gas was being "sold" when so delivered and that such
sales were "off the premises," making the "market value" portion of the
royalty clause applicable. As a result, Exxon was liable for the royalty/market price differential. Although the court agreed with Butler's
holding that market value must be determined at the date of delivery
rather than at the date of the execution of the long-term contracts, the
cases are squarely in conflict as to the proper interpretation of the phrases
"off the premises" and "at the wells." 34
The cases also are in conflict on the question whether division orders
expressly committed to "the life of the lease" are supported by consideration or are unilaterally revocable by the lessors. In Middleton the court
held that the division orders, which changed the royalty obligation from
payment based upon market value to payment based upon the proceeds
received by the lessee, were supported by consideration and, hence, were
revocable only by mutual consent.
Middleton included a detailed discussion of the manner in which market
value should be computed. The case was remanded because the expert
testimony upon which the market value had been based did not comply
with the guidelines set forth in Vela. The court stated that under Vela the
following factors must be considered:
(1) the relevant marketing area is the field in which the gas was produced; (2) the market price of gas is to be determined by reference to
sales of gas comparable in time, quality and availability to marketing
outlets; (3) the mathematical average of all prices paid in the field is
not a final answer to determining market value price at any particular
time; (4) the relevant period of time to be used in determining the
amount that should have been paid to the royalty owners is the specific period in question; and (5) an expert's opinion based upon a
mathematical average of prices paid in the field and corroborated by
comparable sales from the field during the relevant period may afford
34. The court did apply the "sold at the wells" provision for payment of royalty under
the "amount realized" clause where delivery was made to purchasers on Sun Oil lease lands
and then transported off the lands before resale. 571 S.W.2d at 363-64.
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a basis for determining market price.35
The court also rejected Exxon's proposition that its stated field price
should control, basing its rejection on Exxon's inclusion of noncomparable
sales in the computation of its field price. All sales involved in Middleton
were intrastate, but the field price base of Exxon included interstate sales
and sales to affiliates. In rejecting the inclusion of interstate sales, the
court appended the following interesting footnote:
We do not believe that the Texas courts will apply the principles of
Vela to federally controlled or regulated interstate gas, since there can
be no "market value" or "market price" in a price-regulated environment, although we recognize that the supreme court did permit the
consideration in Vela of the price of regulated gas sold to Tennessee
Gas from the Lopeno Field. We also note that in 1977, FPC functions
were transferred to the new Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
and the FPC was terminated. Department of Energy Organization
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7171, 7172, 7293 (Supp. 1977).
Although the Texas Supreme Court found no reversible error in Butler
and refused to grant writ, the serious conflicts between Butler and Middleton should prompt the court to grant writ in this more recent case.
Repercussions of Vela were felt yet again in Hemus & Co. v. Hawkins,17
in which royalty owners argued that royalty payments should have been
based upon the "market value" of the increased price paid for intrastate
gas sales. This case involved the sale of a split stream of gas. Two lessees
sold gas exclusively into the Texas intrastate market, while the defendant,
Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America, sold gas in the interstate market under contracts so dedicated. The price paid for gas sold in the Texas
market was greater than the price received under the long-term interstate
gas sales contracts. The issue was whether under a market value royalty
clause contained in a lease that bound the lessee to sell all its gas into the
interstate market, sales into the intrastate market were "comparable." The
lessee argued not that market value for the royalty obligation was to be
determined solely by the lessee's contract in the interstate market, but that
market value must be predicated upon comparable sales, which would not
include sales in the intrastate market.
The court held that where gas is dedicated to interstate commerce, only
sales in the interstate market are comparable. The court distinguished
Vela because in that case market value for royalty purposes had been
based on the increased price paid for current sales of gas into the interstate
market. Thus, the question whether intrastate sales are "comparable" for
purposes of determining the market value of gas dedicated to interstate
commerce was not in issue.
The Texas Supreme Court considered another question involving royalty on interstate gas sales in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum
35. Id. at 362.
36. Id at 362 n.3.
37. 452 F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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Co. 38 Phillips purchased casinghead gas from Stahl, payment for which
was based on a percentage of the "weighted average price received" by
Phillips from subsequent sales to third parties. Phillips was to pay Stahl
not later than the last day of each succeeding month.
Prior to the Stahl contract, Phillips had applied for a rate increase from
the Federal Power Commission. Pending the FPC's response, Phillips
charged its customers the increased rate, subject to refund, but did not
consider the price increase when calculating its payments to Stahl. After
eighteen years the rate increases were partially approved and partially rejected.
Phillips filed suit for a declaratory judgment that such payments were
not subject to the payment of interest; Stahl counterclaimed for interest.
Phillips' theory was that prejudgment interest cannot be allowed eo nomine
unless provided for by contract or by statute. Here the gas purchase contract did not provide for the payment of such interest, nor did it provide
for the retention of any portion of a requested rate increase that might be
subject to refund.
The court of appeals3 9 reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of
Phillips, finding that Stahl was paid in full. Furthermore, the court assessed interest on this sum from the date payment was made to the date of
judgment, in essence forcing Phillips to pay interest on interest. The Texas
Supreme Court affirmed on two grounds. The first followed the sole
ground for the holding of the court of appeals, which was that interest was
payable under articles 5069-1.01 and 5069-1.03 of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes.' Phillips' argument that no sum was ascertainable or due
and payable until the finality of the FPC's order was not sustainable, as it
was contrary to the plain wording of the gas purchase contract which contained no exceptions allowing for the withholding of funds collected pursuant to unapproved rate increases. The main point of affirmance was
based on the general equitable principle "that 'Phillips ought not to be able
to use someone else's money as it pleases for ten years, thereby enjoying a
very considerable benefit, and then pay nothing for the use of the
money,' ,,'a principle not even mentioned by the court of appeals. Under
these circumstances the court found an equitable exception to the "interest
eo nomine" rule.
The question that immediately comes to mind is whether the Stahl holding is applicable to those instances where royalty owners have funds suspended due to title matters. The court pointed out that if there were no
agreement to so retain such monies without interest, then interest would be
38. 569 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1978).
39. 550 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977).
40. Article 5069-1.01 defines interest as including compensation allowed by law for
the detention of money, and art. 5069-1.03 sets the legal rate of interest for written contracts that specify a sum payable but do not fix an interest rate for past due payments. TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-1.01, .03 (Vernon 1971).

41. 569 S.W.2d at 485 (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975)).
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payable to their retention. On the other hand, the court stated that in those
instances where appropriate provisions allowing for the suspension of payments were contained in division orders, such provisions would prevail.
This, however, should not preclude the payment of interest when payments have been retained pursuant to provisions of a division order but
such retention was unreasonable under the facts.
Delay Rental Clause. In Brannon v. Gulf States Energy Corp.42 the court
of appeals held that parol evidence could be admitted to show that payments accompanied by a letter that referred to them as "lease rental," for a
lease that had otherwise expired for nonpayment of rental, were actually
bonus payments for a new lease on the same tract. Gulf States, the lessee
under the new lease, had drilled several wells on the lease lands. On appeal the Texas Supreme Court reversed the holdings of both the trial court
and court of appeals on the ground that the letter and check were contractual in nature, and thus parol evidence was not admissible. Thus, the letter's recital of the payment as lease rental was controlling, and the
acceptance of the late delay rental payment had the effect of reviving the
earlier lease. The high court also held that, under the facts, Gulf States
had sufficient interest in the original leasehold estate so as not to be a
stranger to the initial lease, which otherwise would have precluded the application of the parol evidence rule.
The supreme court remanded the case to determine whether Gulf States
could receive recoupment of its reasonable costs and expenses as a good
faith trespasser, a status that would not be precluded by its knowledge of
the former lease. Gulf States did not enter upon the leasehold pendente
lite, and, in fact no suit was filed prior to the spudding of its first two wells.
Dry Hole Clause. The only significant case in this area is that of Chandler
v. Drummet,4 3 which involved a lease with a ten-year primary term and a
120-day obligatory well drilling clause. The clause provided that the lease
would be valid and in effect if a test well was commenced within the time
period. Although a well was timely commenced, it came in dry, and the
lessee did not initiate additional drilling operations within sixty days.
The problem in the case was caused by the striking of the delay rental
clause from the lease without a corresponding modification of the normal
dry hole clause. Under the dry hole clause the lessee was obligated within
sixty days after drilling a dry hole to commence additional drilling operations, or, if within the primary term, to commence the payment of delay
rentals on or before the next rental payment date. Since the lessee drilled
the dry hole within the first year of the lease, he could have commenced
the payment of delay rentals at the end of the first year if the delay rental
clause had been retained. This option, however, was not open to the
lessee. The question then became whether the lease had terminated be42. 548 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland), rev'd, 562 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. 1977). The

court of appeals opinion is discussed in Hemingway, supra note 13, at 173.
43. 557 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).

1979]

OIL AND GAS

cause additional operations had not been begun within the sixty-day period. The lessee strongly urged: (1) that the provisions of the dry hole
clause should not apply; (2) that in any event the lessee had a reasonable
time to commence additional operations under the lease, which time limit
would not be controlled by the dry hole clause; or, (3) that due to the
drilling of the test well, the lease was in effect for the entire ten-year period.
The court reviewed the old case of Texas Co. v. Davis," which held that
if delay rentals were not payable a lease could be terminated if the lessee
had abandoned the purpose of the lease, that is, if the lessee held for speculative purposes as opposed to development. The Chandler court concluded that by setting a sixty-day limit the dry hole clause eliminated any
potential confusion as to what would constitute a reasonable time within
which exploration must be renewed in order to prevent abandonment.
The problem in Chandlerwas caused by the parties' failure to determine
sufficiently the effect of the omission of the delay rental clause. The result
may or may not have been the one they intended. Nevertheless, clear
draftsmanship would have prevented this needless litigation.
Pooling Clause. Two rather important cases were decided in Texas dealing with whether a lessee has exercised the pooling authority in good faith.
The first case is Elliott v. Davis,"5 in which the court discussed extensively
the nature of the relationship of the lessee to the lessor in the exercise of
the pooling authority. The lessor in Elliott sought to cancel leases on the
ground that the lessee had exercised the pooling authority in bad faith. He
argued that the lessee should be treated as a trustee, whose actions must
comply with a strict fiduciary standard. The court, however, defined the
relationship as follows:
Although it has been said that the lessee has a fiduciary obligation in
the exercise of the pooling power, it is submitted that the lessee is not
a fiduciary and that standards applied to fiduciaries are entirely too
strict. This is so because the lessee has not undertaken to manage and
develop the property for the sole benefit of the lessor. The lessee has
substantial interests that must be taken into account, and he should
not be required to subordinate his own interests entirely to the interests of the lessor. Since his interests frequently conflict with those of
his lessor, however, he must exercise the power in fairness and in good
faith, taking into account the interests of both the lessor and lessee.46
The court further held that the failure of the Texas Railroad Commission to approve a unit or pool is not, in itself, determinative of the question
of good faith. The case was remanded since a fact issue on good faith
remained. The case is important because it is one of the very few that
44. 113 Tex. 321, 254 S.W. 304 (1923).
45. 553 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
46. Id. at 226-27 (quoting 4 E. KUNTZ, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 48.3, at 219
(1972)).
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discusses the standard of conduct of the lessee in exercising the pooling
authority.
47
The second case in this area, Amoco Production Co. v. Underwood,
applied the good faith standard outlined in Elliott. In Amoco the appellate
court held that the lessee had in fact exercised the pooling authority in bad
faith. By pooling, the lessee had been able to preserve a majority of his
leases that would otherwise have expired, including lands upoAi which the
evidence showed there was no probability of the lessee drilling and upon
which the lessee had no plans to drill additional wells.
The clause in Amoco allowed pooling " 'when in Lessee's judgment it is
necessary or advisable to do so in order to properly develop and operate
said premises.' "48 Within this context the court held that pooling merely
to hold leases that would otherwise expire and that lessee had no plans to
develop constituted bad faith. The court, however, did not comment on
the common practice of including small parts of leases in a pool when they
are nearing the end of their primary terms in order to prevent termination.
Where it is reasonably within the contemplation of the lessee to develop
the leases, such pooling would not seem to be proscribed by the opinion.
Stephenson v. Vineyard 9 concerned the question whether a reserved
term royalty interest was maintained in existence after the two-year term
by pooled production from an off-lease tract. Prior to conveying the land
in question, the Stephensons had executed an oil and gas lease that contained pooling provisions. Additionally, the deed was expressly made
"subject to" the existing lease. Within the two-year period production was
obtained from lands with which the lease had been pooled. The court held
that the pooled production did not inure to and perpetuate the term royalty interest.
The decision appears to be in error. The basis of the court's conclusion
was that acceptance by the grantee of a deed "subject to" the lease did not
have the effect of ratifying the lease. This may or may not be an accurate
statement of the law, as cases in Texas have held that acceptance of such a
deed has the effect of ratification." These cases are subject to criticism,
however, on the ground that the clause is primarily for the purpose of
avoiding liability on the part of the grantor for breach of warranty due to
the outstanding lease and not for ratification by the grantee.
Regardless, the court did not consider that at the time the lease was
executed with pooling authority, the lessor was the owner of the entire
mineral estate, except for an outstanding royalty interest whose owner expressly ratified the lease. The question is whether the lessor, after execution of the lease, could convey an interest not subject to the pooling
authority of the lessee. In Texas, in the case of an entirety clause in a
47. 558 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Id at 511 (emphasis added).
49. 564 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1978, writ refd n.r.e.). This
case is also discussed in the text accompanying note 22 supra.
50. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Clark, 126 Tex. 262, 87 S.W.2d 471 (1935); Van Deventer
v. Gulf Prod. Co., 41 S.W.2d 1029 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, writ refd).
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lease, it has been held that the lessor cannot thereafter convey free from
the entirety clause, that is, put the conveyed royalty interest back on a nonapportionment basis, without the joinder of the lessee. 5 The same result
should obtain when a royalty interest is conveyed after the execution of a
lease containing pooling authority and binding all interests of the grantorlessor. When a nonparticipating royalty exists prior to the execution of the
lease containing the pooling provision, a different rule prevails, and it is
clear that in Texas the attempted pooling by the lessee will not bind the
nonparticipating royalty owner, unless he ratifies the pooling agreement.
The recent case of Ruiz v. Martin5 2 contains an example of such ratification.
Implied Covenants. In Wes-Tex Land Co. v. Simmons5 3 the assignor of an
oil and gas lease requested cancellation of the assignment and damages
after the assignee failed to drill an offset well to prevent drainage. In the
assignment the assignor had reserved an overriding royalty interest of 1/ 16
of 8/8. The assignor offered proof that a reasonably prudent lessee would
have drilled, in that a well drilled upon the subject land would have produced in paying quantities. The court held that the assignee impliedly
covenanted to protect the premises against drainage when the assignor reserved an overriding royalty.54 As a result, the assignor was entitled to the
amount of royalty he would have received if the offset well had been properly drilled, at least up to the amount requested as damages. The assignor
was denied cancellation on the grounds that the obligation was a covenant,
not a condition, and that the assignor had not asked for an alternative,
conditional decree, a prerequisite to the granting of this equitable remedy.
The proper test as to whether a reasonably prudent lessee would drill an
offset well is whether the well would produce sufficiently to pay the lessee
all costs and expenses of drilling, equipping, and producing the well, as
well as return a reasonable profit. It is unclear in this opinion whether
such potential production was shown by the evidence.
FiduciaryRelationship. Two cases were appealed during the past year involving the imposition of a constructive trust. They reached different conclusions in determining whether a fiduciary relationship existed and a
constructive trust could be imposed.
In Echols v. Yeates Development Co. 5 the lessee acquired oil and gas
leases and employed Echols to acquire additional leases for the benefit of
both Echols and the lessee. Echols was also acting as an agent for the
defendant lessors. The plaintiff lessee drilled a gas well that was shut in
and upon which shut-in royalties were not timely paid. For a year after
51. Cockrell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 157 Tex. 10, 299 S.W.2d 672 (1956).
52. 559 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
53. 566 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ rer'd n.r.e.).
54. This question was finally settled in Texas in the case of Bolton v. Coats, 533 S.W.2d
914 (Tex. 1975).
55. 565 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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the well was shut in Echols worked with the lessee on title matters. During
this time Echols knew that the lessee was spending time and money negotiating for a higher gas price and constructing a gas pipeline. Echols, however, did not inform the lessee that nonpayment of the shut-in royalties
would terminate the lease. Instead he acquired new leases on the land for
his own benefit.
The lessee brought suit for a judgment that the original leases had not
terminated. The judgment was granted by the trial court and affirmed by
the court of appeals, which held that the trial court's finding of a fiduciary
relationship between Echols and the lessee was supported by the evidence.
Since Echols was the defendant lessors' agent, both he and the lessors were
estopped by his silence when such silence was designed to induce the lessee
into further developing the lease. The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding that the original leases had not terminated and that a constructive trust would be imposed upon any other leases acquired by the
agent and the defendants during this period. The court did not discuss the
agreement or any other factors defining the fiduciary relationship between
the lessee and Echols.
At issue in Hoover v. Cooke56 was whether a fiduciary relationship existed between two independent geologists. Cooke contacted Hoover, a geologist in the employ of Southland Royalty Company, to determine
whether Southland would be interested in acquiring leases in the Pearsall
Field in Frio County, Texas. Finding that Southland was interested in
acquiring leases, Cooke furnished Hoover with a report of the field and a
method of production. Cooke had prepared the report after studying the
field for a number of years and had proposed special production techniques to make production economical. The report was furnished only to
those who desired to acquire leases in the field.
Cooke was unaware of an agreement between Hoover and Southland
whereby Hoover could acquire for his own benefit any leases presented by
him to Southland that it decided not to take. Hoover visited Cooke's offices many times and had access to his information on the field. He eventually acquired those leases in the field that Southland rejected.
Upon finding that Hoover had acquired leases within the scope of the
report for his individual benefit, Cooke brought suit to impose a constructive trust upon the leases involved. The basis of the suit was that a confidential relationship existed between Cooke and Hoover due to many years
of friendship and business and social contact. Cooke also contended that
the report was for the exclusive use of Southland Royalty Company and
was not to be used by Hoover individually.
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals held that no confidential
relationship existed between the parties; the relationship between them
was not of the type that would give rise to a constructive trust. The court
pointed out that trust in the context of a moral, social, domestic, or purely
56. 566 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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personal relationship does not normally transform the relationship into
one of trust and confidence for purposes of imposing a constructive trust.
The court further noted that both parties were experienced businessmen on
an equal footing in education, ability, experience, and business acumen,
and in such circumstances each party must exercise due care for the protection of his own interests.
III.

REGULATION CASES

In RailroadCommission v. GrafordOil Corp.57 the Texas Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the district court of Travis County invalidating
an order of the Texas Railroad Commission. The Commission's order had
consolidated nine gas fields into one field for spacing and proration purposes, setting 320-acre proration units with a 100 percent acreage allowance. Upon the application of Mitchell Energy Corporation 58 for
consolidation of the fields, notice of a hearing was given to operators of
record of affected land, but no notice was given to owners of unleased
lands that were affected. About seventy-five owners of these unleased
lands intervened.
The order was first remanded by the district court on the ground that the
order was not supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by section 16(b) of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act.59 The
Commission then issued a second order that was identical to the first with
the exception that the required findings were made. Graford and the intervening landowners brought a second appeal to the district court, which
found the order invalid on the following grounds: the order did not contain fact findings that the hydrocarbons it affected constituted one common
reservoir; there was no substantial evidence to support such a finding; and,
the owners of unleased property affected by the order had been deprived of
property rights without due process of law when denied the right to intervene in the hearing before the Commission. The Railroad Commission
and Mitchell appealed directly to the Texas Supreme Court, which affirmed on all counts.
The Railroad Commission and Mitchell claimed that the statutory definition of a common reservoir, that which "appears to be underlaid by a
common pool or accumulation of oil and/or gas," 6° should be construed as
meaning that which "appears to be underlaid by a common pool or/by an]
accumulation of oil and/or gas."'" The supreme court disagreed with the
latter interpretation, holding that in the statute the word "common" modified both "pool" and "accumulation."
The court defined a common reservoir as one in which all producing
57. 557 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. 1977).

58. Mitchell Energy Corporation is involved in several of the cases reviewed in this
Article. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 23 & 37 supra and 65 _nfra.
59. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13a, § 16(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
60. Id art. 6008, § 2(c) (Vernon 1962) (repealed 1977).

61. 557 S.W.2d at 950 (emphasis added).
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areas are in natural communication. The facts as found by the Commission showed that the completed wells furnished the only communication
between the vertically-separated producing areas; thus, they did not form a
common reservoir.
The court further noted that the appeal procedure did not afford an adequate remedy for the owners of the unleased lands who had not appeared
before the Commission. These persons had property rights that might be
adversely affected and that were different from those asserted by other parties appearing before the Commission. The denial of the right to appear at
the Commission hearing was effectively a denial of the opportunity to be
heard on the real decision-making level because the trial court in Travis
County is powerless to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission;
it cannot enter what it might believe to be a correct order, but can only
remand to the Commission.
In Calfornia v. Southland Royalty Co.6 2 the United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the Fifth Circuit's decision in Southland
Royalty Co. v. FPC,6 3 which had held that gas that had been dedicated
into interstate commerce under oil and gas leases with a fixed fifty-year
term ceased being so dedicated upon the termination of the leases. The
ground for the Fifth Circuit's holding was that since the lessee's rights in
the gas under the leasehold lands could not survive the termination of its
fifty-year lease, it could not create rights in a third person to that same gas
beyond the fifty-year period.
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that once gas was dedicated
into the interstate market under an unlimited certificate of convenience
and necessity, the obligation to serve the interstate market continued until
abandonment was authorized under section 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act. 64
The obligation arose as a matter of law rather than contract and was binding upon all those with dominion and power of sale over the gas, including
the lessors who owned the reversion.
In Superior Oil Co. v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission,65 the last
case noted in this section, the Fifth Circuit upheld the validity of orders of
the Federal Power Commission requiring producers to report yearly detailed information relating to expenditures, exploration and development
activity, production, reserve additions, and revenues. The court also held
that information so submitted could be publicly disclosed even though it
falls within the exclusions of the Freedom of Information Act. These exclusions merely offer exemptions from compelled disclosure; they do not
prohibit federal agencies from voluntarily publishing the information.
62. 98 S. Ct. 1955, 56 L. Ed. 2d 505 (1978).
63. 543 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1976). This opinion is discussed in Hemingway, supra note
13, at 177.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
65. 563 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1977).
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IV.

MISCELLANEOUS CASES

In Lone Star Gas Co. v. HowardCorp.66 the courts dealt with the following favored nations clause in a gas purchase and sale agreement:
"COMPARATIVE PRICE ADJUSTMENTS: If, at any time or
times, subsequent to the date of the execution of this agreement and so
long as gas is delivered hereunder, there shall be in effect any agreement between Buyer and any otherproducer or producers of gas providing for the purchase of gasproduced in District 8 of the Railroad
Commission of Texas, as presently constituted, at apriceperone thousand (1,000) cubic feet higher than the priceper one thousand (1,000)
cubic feet, payable at the same time hereunder andfor gas of a like
charactertaken under substantially similar provisions relating to delivery, pressures, quantity, compression requirements, and primary
terms of contract, then Buyer will thereupon increase the price thereafter payable hereunder so that it will equal the price payable at the
same time under such other agreement, and such higher price hereunder shall continue in effect during the remainder of the primary term
of this contract so long as any such higher price is paid for gas by
Buyer under any such other agreement." 67
The buyer entered into subsequent contracts with others that provided for
higher prices to be paid for the gas purchased. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that such contracts triggered the price increase clause. The Texas Supreme Court at first granted writ in this case,
but then reversed itself in a short opinion, finding that sufficient evidence
supported the trial court's determination that Lone Star Gas had subsequently purchased gas of a like character, taken under substantially similar
provisions. The supreme court also agreed with the court of appeals' holding that a contract containing a price increase clause was not a special
contract under article 2226,68 and, therefore, the trial court had correctly
awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff.
In another Texas Supreme Court case, Cohen v. McCutchin,69 the ques-

tion presented was whether two letter agreements providing for the assignment of part of the working interest in leases and the proportionate sharing
of drilling and completion costs satisfied the Statute of Frauds7" so as to
support a suit brought by the estate of the assignor. The letter agreements
were neither signed by the assignor, written on his letterhead, nor otherwise identified with him. The trial court entered a summary judgment that
the estate of the assignor take nothing in its suit, a judgment affirmed by
both the court of appeals7 and the Texas Supreme Court.
The administrator of the assignor's estate asserted that the court also
should have considered both the transmittal letter that accompanied the
66.
S.W.2d
67.
68.

556 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977), writ refd n.r.e.per curiam, 568
129 (Tex. 1978).
556 S.W.2d at 374 (emphasis added by the court).
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).

69. 565 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1978).
70. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1978-79).
71. 554 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977).
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checks used for partial payment of the drilling costs of the well and the
check stubs themselves. The supreme court held that these writings also
failed to identify the assignor as a party to the agreements. The court
stated:
This statute requires that, with respect to the agreements defined
therein, there must be a written memorandum which is complete
within itself in every material detail, and which contains all of the
essential elements of the agreement, so that the contract can be
72 ascertained from the writings without resorting to oral testimony.
V.

LEGISLATION

The only significant legislative enactments affecting oil and gas were two
amendments to the Water Code, providing for: (1) a Deepwater Port Authority to develop an offshore port for the accommodation of supertankers
importing crude oil and other liquified petroleum products; 73 and (2) the
issuance of temporary water permits for the use of water in oil and gas
drilling operations.74

72. 565 S.W.2d at 232.
73. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 19.001-.149 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79).
74. 1977 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 152, § 1, at 319 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 5.137(a)).

